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WILLIAM C. LANE
Abstract Leibniz said that the universe, if God-created, would exist at a unique, conjoint, physical
maximum: Of all possible worlds, it would be richest in phenomena, but its richness would arise
from the simplest physical laws and initial conditions. Using concepts of ‘‘variety’’ and algorithmic
informational complexity, Leibniz’ claim can be reframed as a testable theory. This theory predicts
that the laws and conditions of the actual universe should be simpler, and the universe richer in
phenomena, than the presence of observers would require. Tegmark has shown that inhabitants of an
infinite multiverse would likely observe simple laws and conditions, but also phenomenal richness
just great enough to explain their existence. Empirical observations fit the claim of divine choice
better than the claim of an infinite multiverse. The future of the universe, including its future
information-processing capacity, is predicted to be endless.
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If only we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find
that it surpasses all the desires of the wisest, and that it is impossible to make it any
better than it is. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz1
The a priori probability that a randomly generated universe would be capable of
supporting complex life is, by all accounts, vanishingly small.2 Yet the values of
many physical constants seem tuned to give our actual Universe just that
capability.3 Scientists, philosophers, and theologians have advanced many
possible explanations for this ‘‘fine-tuning coincidence.’’4 While these explanations
vary widely, they fall into two broad categories. We can label those categories
‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘multiverse.’’
In the choice category are theories that say some physical process, selection
principle, or creator deity picked our physical laws and initial conditions out of
the infinite possibilities that might have come to exist. Our special set of laws and
conditions therefore exists for a reason. Perhaps it was the only set chosen, or
perhaps it is one of a limited number of chosen sets. Not all ‘‘choice’’ theories
involve a ‘‘Chooser.’’ While some are plainly theistic, others appeal to the
Darwinian notion that choice can result from mindless, natural causes.5 However,
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all choice theories agree on this: For some reason only one or a (relative) handful
of sets of laws and conditions actually exist. Vastly many other possible sets of
laws and conditions, in fact an infinite range of possibilities, might have existed
a priori, but for some reason do not.
The competing multiverse theories suggest that our ‘‘visible universe’’—
everything that we can see—is only a tiny, atypical region in an infinitely vast
‘‘Multiverse’’ (set of universes). A limitless number of other regions actually exist
elsewhere in the Universe. Wherever these regions may be, and however they
may have arisen, they exhibit an equally limitless range of differing, but actually
existent physical laws and conditions. As a result, according to David Lewis,
‘‘There are so many other worlds . . . that absolutely every way that a world could
possibly be is a way that some world is . . . ’’6 Almost none of these ‘‘worlds’’
support life or anything else of interest, but our rare region does. We find
ourselves in this life-supporting region because (a) it must exist along with all the
others, and (b) we must inhabit a region that supports our existence.7
Scientific opinion has until recently given grudging assent to the multiverse
principle.8 However, a recent paper by Stoeger, Ellis, and Kirchner (‘‘SEK’’)
strongly suggests that some principle of choice must be at work in the Universe.9
SEK argues that:
1. There are strong mathematical and logical reasons to doubt that an actually
realized, physical Universe could be infinite in any meaningful sense.
2. In any event, there is no unique, actually infinite Universe. One possible
Universe, though infinite in extent, might contain many ‘‘Type A’’ regions but
none of ‘‘Type B.’’ Another equally infinite Universe might consist entirely of
‘‘Type B’’ regions. A Universe that is infinite in extent need not contain an
infinite diversity of regions. It need not occupy all of possibility space.
3. Thus, even in an actually infinite Universe, something—some person, process,
or principle—must distribute laws and conditions in its regions one way
rather than another. We cannot dispense with choice.
These arguments suggest that choice-based approaches deserve more scrutiny
than they have received. This paper will examine one such approach, advanced by
Leibniz three centuries ago. This is his claim that a perfect God would only create
the ‘‘best’’ of possible Worlds.10 As will be explained below, Leibniz suggested a
sense of World merit under which it is possible to claim that there could be a best
of possible Worlds. This paper will: (a) suggest that Leibniz’ notion of World merit
is subject to quantification and empirical test; and (b) advance considerations for
believing that our actual World is the best of possible Worlds in this sense.
Leibniz’ richest/simplest claim
Leibniz was probably the first to notice that the structure of the Universe is not
logically required, that everything, including the laws of physics, might have been
fundamentally different.11 Even ‘‘time, space and matter . . .might have received
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entirely other motions and shapes, and in another order.’’12 He wondered why,
out of an infinite number of possibilities, the Creator chose to actualize this
particular setup, the Universe that we know and inhabit. This question led him to
a remarkable conjecture.
Leibniz envisioned God as possessing all perfections: infinite wisdom and
power as well as perfect goodness.13 Because he believed that God would not act
without a reason, he argued that God would actualize only the best of possible
Worlds. ‘‘[T]his is the cause for the existence of the best: namely, that his wisdom
makes it known to God, his goodness makes him choose it, and his power makes
him produce it.’’14
At least since Voltaire, Leibniz’ critics have seen this claim as a valid argument
to an ‘‘immensely implausible conclusion.’’15 Yet is the conclusion so
implausible? Most critics never address the final term of Leibniz’ argument,
his specific description of the best of possible Worlds. Leibniz phrased that
description in a number of ways: ‘‘[T]he most perfect World’’ is ‘‘the one which
is at the same time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena, as
might be a line in geometry whose construction is easy and whose properties
and effects are extremely remarkable and widespread.’’16 ‘‘It follows from the
supreme perfection of God that in producing the Universe He chose the best
possible plan, containing the greatest variety together with the greatest
order . . . the greatest effect produced by the simplest means. . ..’’17 ‘‘[P]erfection
is not to be located in matter alone, that is, in something filling time and
space . . . rather, it is to be located in form or variety.’’18 The Leibnitian Universe
(since the Universe is everything that God creates, there can only be one) would
exhibit the greatest possible variety, richness and abundance of natural
phenomena, but these would result from the simplest possible ‘‘hypotheses’’
(the Universe’s physical laws and initial conditions).
Thus, Leibniz’ metaphysical assumption of God’s perfection led to a specific,
physical description of the Universe.19 We can call that description Leibniz’
richest/simplest claim. This ‘‘two-factor assessment of perfection’’ insists on
both richness as an end and simplicity as a means.20 Each is equally important:
‘‘For the wisest mind so acts as far as is possible, that the means are also ends
of a sort, i.e. are desirable not only on account of what they do, but on account
of what they are.’’21 Leibnitian perfection is, ‘‘a matter of combining,
harmonizing and balancing [these] two distinct factors’’ into a joint
maximum.22
One intriguing point about this claim is its close agreement with descriptions of
the actual Universe proffered by modern scientists. Freeman Dyson says that our
simple laws seem designed to ‘‘make the universe as interesting as possible.’’23
Carl Sagan says our Universe is ‘‘lavish beyond imagining.’’24 Astronomer Mario
Livio suggests a ‘‘cosmological aesthetic principle’’ involving simplicity, symme-
try, and the Copernican principle.25 Murray Gell-Mann marvels at how, ‘‘[i]n an
astonishing variety of contexts, apparently complex structures or behaviors
emerge from systems characterized by very simple rules.’’26 Physicist A. Zee
reports that the Universe exhibits, ‘‘unity and diversity, absolute perfection and
boisterous dynamism, symmetry and lack of symmetry.’’27 Paul Davies says that
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the Universe seems to be governed by ‘‘very special laws that guarantee a trend
toward greater richness, diversity and complexity through spontaneous self-
organization. . . .’’28
Quantifying simplicity and richness
Another salient feature of Leibniz’ richest/simplest claim is its potential to specify
the single, best possible Universe from an infinite range of possibilities. No single-
factor criterion can do this. No possible Universe could contain ‘‘the most’’
phenomena; more could always be added. No possible Universe could be
‘‘happiest’’; it could always be happier. By contrast, a Universe whose design
requirement opposes two competing factors can (potentially) attain a maximum.
In such a World, the need for laws and initial conditions to be simple prevents
mere chaos from piling up, while the requirement that laws and conditions
generate maximal richness prevents the World’s ‘‘hypotheses’’ from being so
simple as to be useless. Leibniz’ claim thereby defeats the riposte that a search for
the ‘‘best possible World’’ is like a search for the highest number. It suggests the
possibility of a unique balance, a uniquely ‘‘best’’ World,29 or at least a uniquely
best set of World-generating physical laws and initial conditions.30 However, can
Leibniz’ claim actually specify a quantitatively unique point of balance, or does it
only make a qualitative suggestion? The answer turns on whether we can state it
mathematically.
Quantifying simplicity
The standard measure of relative simplicity is ‘‘algorithmic information content’’
(‘‘AIC’’). The AIC of anything is just the length of the shortest set of computer
instructions that, if followed, would completely generate, compute, or describe
that thing.31 AIC can be measured in bits. The AIC of a wagon is the number of
bits needed for a program that will print out a complete description of the wagon.
The description of an automobile would require a longer program, one with a
higher AIC. Calculations of AIC can yield different results depending on the
hardware and software used and other extraneous factors,32 but these factors
typically wash out when relative simplicity is at issue and the same approach is
taken for all measurements.33
Our imperfect knowledge of physics and cosmogony poses a sharper limitation.
To measure the AIC of our actual laws of physics and initial conditions, we first
need to know what they are. Most physicists would say that we do not yet have
the ‘‘final’’ laws of physics; nor can we precisely describe the Universe’s first
fractional second of existence. However, it should be possible to calculate the AIC
of these ‘‘final’’ laws and conditions when (if) we someday discover them, and to
compare that calculated quantity with the AIC of other possible sets of laws and
initial conditions. AIC is therefore, in principle, a reasonable way to measure and
compare the simplicity of our ‘‘hypotheses.’’
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Quantifying richness
Richness is a more complex subject. Indeed, complexity is an important aspect
of richness. Today we say that a system is complex if it includes many parts
that interconnect in intricate ways. A living cell is complex; a salt crystal is not.
One characteristic of a complex system is its structured self-similarity. Small
regions resemble bigger regions; discrete components and processes repeat, but
rarely in the same way. A Universe of maximal complexity would be an
elegant World, a blend of order and diversity. It would exhibit what
Heisenberg called a ‘‘proper conformity of the parts to one another and to
the whole.’’34 A rich World in Leibniz’ sense would be full of detailed, non-
repetitive, self-similar structure.
It would also be large. We can think of Leibnitian richness as ‘‘complexity plus,’’
where the ‘‘plus’’ is size. A Leibnitian Universe would contain a vast number of
complex phenomena, each interrelated in diverse ways to other phenomena, each
a composite of many parts. All of these diverse, nested phenomena would owe
their existence to simple and ‘‘sublime principles which show the wisdom of the
Author in the order and perfection of his work.’’35
Physicists Julian Barbour and Lee Smolin (‘‘B&S’’) have made a start on
describing richness mathematically.36 They call their construct ‘‘variety.’’ Here is
how it works: Start with a single elementary particle. We can call the particles
nearest to it, or with which it interacts most directly, its neighborhood. We can say
that a system has higher variety if we need less information to distinguish each of
its elementary constituents from all the other constituents of the system, by
describing its neighborhood. Alternatively, a system has lower variety if we need
more information to distinguish each constituent from the others by describing its
neighborhood. In a low-variety system, each neighborhood has to be big to be
unique. In a high-variety system, each neighborhood can be unique although it
may be quite small. Variety diminishes if you have to go further afield to find a
unique neighborhood; it increases with the total number of elementary constituents
in the system as a whole. ‘‘The variety is a non-local and non-additive quantity,
which can only be applied to a system as a whole. It measures, in a certain sense,
how unique, one from another, the different parts of the system are.’’37
B&S show two ways to calculate the variety of a graph made of dots. The
simpler way is to identify a subgraph with an arbitrary dot, i, as its starting point,
then add to the subgraph each of i’s immediately neighboring dots. Each added
dot counts as a step. As the subgraph grows, map it against every other dot, j, in
the original graph, where j „ i. When you get a subgraph that does not map onto
the neighborhood of a particular j, call the number of steps in that subgraph the
relative indifference of i and that j. When you get a subgraph that does not map
against the neighborhood of any j, call the number of steps in that subgraph the
absolute indifference (R) of i, denoted as Ri. The variety of the graph as a whole
(treating every dot in succession as an i) then equals:
V ¼
X
i
1=Ri ð1Þ
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To see how this might work, imagine that you need to identify every house in
two different, equally sized cities. You cannot use street addresses or north-south
directions; nor can you describe the houses, for they are all identical. You can,
therefore, only describe a house in relation to its neighbors. To identify each house,
you will need to describe its spatial relationship to every nearby house—how far
apart they are, the angles between them and so on—and keep doing that in a
widening circle until you have described a unique neighborhood, a set of
relationships not replicated anywhere else in the city. Once you identify a unique
neighborhood, you have specified the house at its center. You can then do the
same thing for each other house in each city. Imagine that in one city the houses
stand irregularly on narrow, winding streets. The other city has straight streets,
rectangular intersections, and houses evenly spaced. Using the method described
above, the first city would have higher variety. In the city with narrow, winding
streets, you would have to look at fewer neighboring houses to find a unique
neighborhood. Each group of houses in the high-variety city would tend to
embody more information than an equal number of houses in the more regular
city. When a system gets larger, its variety tends to increase.38 In the example of a
city, each additional house would add another ‘‘1’’ to the sum of the numerators
in equation (1). In a large, high-variety system, tiny neighborhoods (e.g.
molecules) might be identical, but would be embedded in larger, non-identical
neighborhoods (e.g. rocks). Large, similar neighborhoods (e.g. human twins)
would be non-identical by virtue of the smaller neighborhoods that compose
them (e.g. their individual cells). B&S conclude that variety ‘‘distinguishes
highly structured, but asymmetric, configurations such as one finds in biological
systems from both random configurations and [ordered] configurations such as
crystals . . . ’’39
Objections to variety as a metric for richness
We can use variety to measure the richness of a small, static system. Can we use it
to measure the richness of the Universe? Two objections have been stated:
(a) The Universe is too complex to measure in this way. It has many different
kinds of particles (electrons, photons, etc.), not just identical dots. Moreover,
its elementary constituents are not really particles in Newton’s ‘‘hard, massy’’
sense; they are more like events that are here one moment, then gone the
next. Finally, the sheer number of particles and the diversity of their
arrangements is incredibly vast. Given these complexities, we will never be
able to map each particle’s neighborhood against all the others, and therefore,
cannot possibly calculate a number that describes universal variety.
(b) Variety does not consider the interactivity of a system’s structures. For
example, it does not consider the kinds of complex interactions that exist in
biological systems. It ignores the sorts of emergent phenomena that make our
Universe an interesting place. Because variety considers only the static
arrangements of particles in a system, it might be higher in a well-stocked
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junkyard than in a similar area of forest.40 It therefore is not, even in
principle, a useful measure of the richness of our Universe.
Response to Objection A
Objection A mistakes the role intended for variety. There is no suggestion that we
measure the variety of the Universe with mathematical precision. The suggestion
instead is that the calculability of variety in principle shows that Leibnitian
‘‘richness’’ has some definite, quantifiable meaning, such that the relative ability of
possible sets of physical laws and initial conditions to generate maximal variety
could be a criterion for selecting a particular set of laws and conditions for
actualization. In principle, this criterion could partly explain why our laws and
conditions are what they are.
This in itself is a large step forward. There have been only a few attempts to
quantify richness and diversity, and those few have occurred in biology. For
example, ecologists distinguish among alpha, beta, and gamma measures of
diversity.41 Yet these measures count only the number of species. They do not
account for diversity within a species, or for the diversity of galaxies, planets, or
human invention. These ecological approaches are therefore not of much use in
specifying a maximally rich universe. Variety in the B&S sense is more useful
precisely because of its ‘‘generic’’ quality. It does not depend on how we
categorize things; it tries to get at the overall character of a system by examining
the arrangements of its elementary particles.42
Moreover, while calculating the Universe’s variety seems out of the question,
estimating it does not seem impossible. We might analogize this problem to the
task of determining the contents of a computer disk. Most of us could not
decipher a disk by reading a printout of its 1’s and 0’s. Yet by employing a
series of intermediate languages—assembler, then an operating language, and
finally a higher-level application—we can make its contents emerge on our
screen. In much the same way, further explorations of the concept of variety
may show us how to determine the relative variety of large systems by
observing their higher-order characteristics.43 Life, for example, may both
provide the highest-variety systems in the Universe and act as the most prolific
source of new, high-variety systems. If so, then the biofriendliest Universe
would also be the highest in variety. As we learn about the role of the physical
constants in the origin of life, the question of whether our Universe is the
biofriendliest of all possibilities might someday seem to have an obvious answer.
We could then decide whether our Universe is (or is not) the highest in variety
of all possibilities without examining the configuration of its elementary
particles.
Objection A’s other concerns also seem surmountable. For example, we might
focus on protons in estimating variety, regarding other particles as merely the
means by which the system arranges protons. Alternatively, we could focus on
fields as the Universe’s fundamental elements; quantum physics handles the
location and interrelation of fields with mathematical precision. The use of fields
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might require a different formalism than the one suggested by B&S, but the
prospect seems to pose no conceptual difficulties.44
While calculating the variety of the protons in a postage stamp would be a
challenging task today, the point of focusing on variety is not to find a single,
precise measure of the richness of our Universe. The objectives instead are (i) to
assure ourselves that richness can have more than a merely subjective meaning,
and (ii) to learn about the specific sorts of higher-level characteristics that we
might expect in the maximally rich Universe. We can then compare our Universe
with other possible Worlds with more confidence that we are focusing on
fundamental rather than parochial characteristics.
Response to Objection B
Objection B is correct to a point. Variety as explained above describes the
arrangement of particles in a static system. However, there are at least two
different approaches to employing the notion of variety in a changing system.
The first, proposed by B&S, would be to regard the maximal variety
configuration as, in some sense, the goal towards which the system tends to
strive. We might then imagine that our laws of physics are the local results of a
non-local potential energy function created by this global tendency toward high
variety.45 A difficulty with this approach is that, while it captures certain
features of the dynamical behavior of the Universe, it does not seem to capture
others.46
An alternative approach (suggested here) would preserve the ontological
independence of our laws of physics, but would suggest that, along with our
initial conditions, they mark the simplest path to maximal variety. This approach
begins by restating equation 1 as follows:
V1 ¼
X
i
1=R in ð2Þ
Here, R in this bold font represents the absolute indifference of i, not over the
Universe at a single moment in time but over the whole history of the Universe
captured at n snapshots of time. The number of snapshots considered in this
formula (represented by n) can be somewhat arbitrary, but must give a reasonable,
overall depiction of the Universe over time, and must include a snapshot from
each important stage of its history. The absolute indifference of i in this equation
would then reflect the smallest number of moves needed to distinguish the
neighborhood of i, not only from all other neighborhoods, but also from i’s own
neighborhood at all later or earlier ‘‘snapshot’’ moments. Owing to this second
requirement, a static system with high variety under equation (1) would display
lower variety under equation (2) than a similar system that changes significantly
over time.
A claim that our Universe has maximal variety over time could then be stated:
V1 > V0 ð3Þ
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Here V1 is the variety over time of our actual Universe and V0 is the variety
over time of any other, possible universe, calculated in the same way and using
the same value for n. Unlike equation (1), expressions (2) and (3) capture the
effects of system interactivity and emergent behaviors because only complex,
dynamic processes could produce the continual changes that would be required
to generate maximal variety over time. A junkyard will either remain a
junkyard or else simply disintegrate. In either event, time will not significantly
enhance its variety as measured in equation (2). In a forest, however, ‘‘endless
forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved.’’47
These evolving forms include not only new species, but also emergent
differences among individuals and new patterns of cooperation and conflict.
So long as biological processes continue to operate, the passage of time will
increase the forest’s variety over time under equation (2). This suggests that,
over time, a universe containing life will have higher variety than a lifeless
universe.
Simplicity and richness
We can now add Leibniz’ conjoint requirement of maximal simplicity:
V1=A1 > V0=A0 ð4Þ
In this inequality, V1 and V0 are from expression (3), while A1 represents the
AIC of the laws of physics and initial conditions of our actual Universe and A0
reflects the same quantity for any other possible universe. Expression (4) reflects
Leibniz’ insistence that our Universe must be better than any other possibility. ‘‘If
there were not the best among all possible worlds, God would not have produced
any.’’48 It also fits with Leibniz’ insight that the ‘‘most perfect possible world is
that which exhibits the greatest variety of its contents (richness of phenomena)
consonant with the greatest simplicity of its laws.’’49 It balances and opposes
simplicity and richness in an intuitively appealing way.50 Expression (4) shows
that Leibniz’ richest/simplest claim could pick out a single, uniquely ‘‘best’’ setup.
Do we inhabit Leibniz’ universe?
The tautological fact that we must find ourselves in a region that supports our
existence defeats many attempts to frame a persuasive argument from design out
of the fine-tuning coincidence. The weak anthropic principle (‘‘WAP’’) suggests
that, regardless of where or how it originated, the Universe must be at least special
enough to produce us.51 Since intelligent observers can (it seems) only exist under
laws of physics similar to ours, it is, the argument runs, unremarkable that we find
ourselves in a Universe governed by such laws.52
On the other hand, it would be remarkable if our Universe were governed by
physical laws and initial conditions that met Leibniz’ conjoint criterion of maximal
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simplicity and fecundity. Under any view of the Copernican principle, it seems
unlikely that the human race or intelligent observers in general are so special that
their existence requires maximal conditions. Instead, many different, relatively
high-variety universes based on relatively simple ‘‘hypotheses’’ should be capable
of supporting creatures like us.53 This intuition, if true, opens a conceptual gap
between the Leibnitian Universe (governed by the richest/simplest principle) and
the merely sufficient Universe predicted by the WAP. This gap offers a way to test
Leibniz’ claim that does not require either a perfect knowledge of the laws of
physics or a detailed analysis of the arrangements of protons. If ours is the best of
possible Worlds, then our laws of physics should be simpler than they need to be to
produce us and our Universe should be richer (higher in apparent variety over
time) than our presence would require.54
Excess simplicity?
Physicist Stephen Wolfram suggests that, ‘‘among all possible rules [of physics],
the overwhelming majority will not be simple; they will instead tend to be almost
infinitely complex.’’55 This is, Wolfram says, because any law of physics must take
the form of some mathematical expression, and there are many more complex
expressions than simple ones. If this logic is sound, and if we inhabit a random
region in the multiverse (except that it lets us exist), then the laws of physics in our
region should be quite complex.
This is not what we experience. In 1981, physicist E. J. Squires wrote a paper
entitled, ‘‘Do we live in the simplest possible interesting world?’’56 Squires
assumed that the world would not be ‘‘interesting’’ without chemistry and stars,
and that stars need nuclear fusion. Then he showed how the electromagnetic force,
the weak and strong nuclear forces, and the properties of quarks, neutrinos,
photons, and electrons might all derive from these two requirements in the
simplest, most parsimonious way. Though Squires did not mention general
relativity, the principle of relativity asserts that the laws of physics must be the
same in all frames of reference. After discovering this principle, Einstein
concluded that, ‘‘experience justifies our belief that nature is the realization of
the simplest mathematical ideas that are reasonable.’’57
Our initial conditions are even simpler. Davies describes the state of the
Universe at the big bang as ‘‘a featureless ferment of quantum energy, a state of
exceptionally high symmetry. Indeed, the initial state of the universe could well
have been the simplest possible.’’58 The entire ‘‘featureless ferment’’ of our
spacetime then expanded with extraordinary rapidity. As it expanded, quantum
processes like those that continue to operate throughout the Universe formed tiny
irregularities, which became the earliest ancestors of every later structure, from
galaxies to philosophy textbooks.
This is a simple beginning, but the real story may be simpler still. Our Universe
may have emerged out of absolutely nothing. Not just empty space, for ‘‘empty’’
space is not empty at all. Physicists call it a ‘‘false vacuum,’’ densely packed with
‘‘dark energy,’’ ‘‘the seat of various energetic processes.’’59 Inflationary big bang
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theory says the Universe emerged from a vastly emptier state, a true vacuum.
Pagels explains:
The nothingness ‘‘before’’ the creation of the universe is the most complete void that
we can imagine—no space, time, or matter existed . . . Yet this unthinkable void
converts itself into a plenum of existence—a necessary consequence of physical
laws . . . It would seem that even the void is subject to law, a logic that exists prior to
time and space.60
No simpler conditions than these—‘‘nothing’’ plus the laws of physics—are
imaginable.
We could, it seems, exist in a universe where the laws of physics varied in
certain inertial systems, or in a World where the weak nuclear force and
electromagnetic force were not the same at the deepest level, or in a World that
did not originate from ‘‘nothing.’’ The fact that we must observe a universe that
we can inhabit does not explain the striking simplicity of our ‘‘hypotheses.’’
Tegmark, however, has suggested a different explanation.61 Taking a bird’s eye
view of mathematics, he shows that it consists of a nested series of mathematical
structures: Adding a metric to the structure called ‘‘topological spaces’’ generates
the structure called ‘‘metric spaces’’; combining tensor spaces with real manifolds
creates the structure called ‘‘manifolds with tensor fields.’’62 In general, complex
structures are just simple structures with added rules or requirements. Tegmark
then makes two assumptions: (i) that physical existence is equivalent to
mathematical existence (the infinite multiverse assumption); and (ii) that
mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction. If these assump-
tions are true, and assuming that self-awareness is a function of complexity, then
all categories of mathematical structure that are complex enough to contain ‘‘self-
aware subsystems’’—Tegmark calls them SAS’s—must exist as physical realities
for the SAS’s (a/k/a ‘‘intelligent observers’’) they contain.
Tegmark goes on to note that, if his claims were true, most SAS’s would find
themselves in the mathematically simplest structures that could possibly produce
them. Ironically, this is because simpler mathematical structures allow for more
complexity. They impose fewer restrictions on possible combinations of their
elements; they thereby allow more differing phenomena than structures with
more rules. In Tegmark’s view, an SAS is likely to find itself in a world governed
by the simplest mathematics that can produce it, even though more complex
mathematics might have produced it as well.
Leibniz made a closely related argument in support of his claim that God
would choose the simplest possible ‘‘hypotheses.’’ He said that simple rules let
God ‘‘find room for as many things as it is possible to place together. If God
had made use of other [more complex] laws, it would be as if one should
construct a building of round stones, which leave more space unoccupied
than . . . they fill.’’63 Picture a fieldstone building of the kind common in Leibniz’
day. The builders used various shapes and sizes of stones; in fact, they used
whatever fit. Any individual stone would be likelier to find itself in a fieldstone
building than in one for which stones are chosen according to a complicated
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rule or pattern. Leibniz claimed that our physical laws and initial conditions
should be maximally simple so that the Universe could contain the greatest
richness of phenomena. Tegmark claims that the ‘‘mathematical structure
describing our world’’ should be ‘‘the most generic one that is consistent with
our observations,’’ i.e. with our ability to observe, precisely because most
phenomena will be contained in the simplest regions capable of hosting them.64
Assuming that both these arguments are valid, the extreme simplicity of our
physical laws cannot distinguish between the Leibnizian and Tegmarkian
explanations. On the other hand, in every contemporary multiverse theory each
constituent ‘‘pocket universe’’ begins from much the same initial conditions.
With no diversity of origins from which to select, Tegmark’s reasoning cannot
explain the extreme simplicity of the big bang.
Excess richness?
Tegmark says that, if the multiverse exists, ‘‘Our observations [should be] the
most generic ones that are consistent with our existence.’’65 If we live in a random,
life-supporting region of the Tegmarkian multiverse, our world should be just rich
enough to include us.66 Leibniz predicts just the opposite: We should find
ourselves in the World containing the greatest possible richness of phenomena, of
which we are not likely to be the supreme example. Thus, were we to discover
richness greatly in excess of that needed for our existence, that discovery would
strongly support Leibniz’ claim.
Is there evidence of excess richness? Might we find more such evidence in the
future? The remainder of this paper addresses these questions.
We might begin by considering the billions of galaxies that we can observe and
the billions of stars they each contain. Hawking says that, ‘‘our solar system is
certainly a prerequisite for our existence, as is an earlier generation of nearby stars
in which heavy elements could have been formed by nuclear synthesis. . . . But
there does not seem any necessity for other galaxies to exist, let alone the million
million or so of them that we see . . .’’67 The vast surfeit of galaxies looks like an
example of excess structure. It seems that we could exist in a universe with a few
hundred galaxies, or perhaps with just one.
The Universe is also larger than it needs to be. The geometry of the Universe—
whether space is flat or curved—does not determine its topology or the rate of its
expansion. Because these are independently determined, the Universe could have
been smaller than the region of space we observe.68 If that had turned out to be the
case, some galaxies we see in one direction from the Earth could be the same ones
we see in the opposite direction. If the Universe were small enough, we might
even see our own Milky Way galaxy as it once existed. This would not be a copy;
it would be the real thing, our galactic home viewed down a vast, curving tunnel
of light. Astronomers have found, however, that nature did not take this ‘‘small
universe’’ path; the Universe appears to be larger than all of observable space.69
The extra richness this extra size requires—extra in the sense that it was not
requisite to our existence—supports Leibniz’ claim.
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More pointedly, we can think about the future. The WAP tells us nothing about
the future. It says only that any universe we inhabit must have been capable of
producing us, of getting us to where we are now. Leibniz’ richest/simplest claim, by
contrast, makes a definite prediction: The greatest possible richness is just the
largest possible ‘‘quantity of reality.’’ Since a longer-lived Universe means more
change, and hence more ‘‘reality,’’ the Universe should continue for as long as
possible. This is a testable prediction, and the early results are in. For a long time
astronomers thought the persistent inward tug of gravity might eventually
overcome the force of the Hubble expansion. As the galaxies fell back into each
other, their mutual gravities could result in a ‘‘big crunch,’’ a moment when
everything would smash into everything else, and that would be the end. We now
know, however, that the Hubble expansion is accelerating.70 Our Universe seems
set to grow forever in both size and duration.71
It has sometimes been suggested that this continuous expansion will end in a
‘‘heat death,’’ a final state of maximum entropy (zero order) when nothing more
can happen.72 However, this is not a necessary outcome. If the Universe expands
at an optimal rate, it can continue experiencing new and interesting phenomena
forever, never losing information.
This point is worth explaining.73 We can define order as the absence of disorder.
Since there is more than one kind of order (living cells versus salt crystals), but
only one kind of disorder (mathematical randomness/maximum entropy),
defining order this way captures all kinds of order. Since information is a
measure of order, we can define information as:
I ¼ Dmax Dactual ð5Þ
According to equation (5), information (order) is present whenever themaximum
possible disorder consistent with given constraints exceeds the actual amount of
disorder. The size of the gap measures the amount of information (order) present.
Imagine a balloon full of compressed gas. The balloon is in the center of a large
spherical room, which otherwise contains a vacuum. The gas in the balloon is in a
state of maximum entropy. Gas molecules moving at different speeds and in
different directions mix together randomly. No order is present until we burst the
balloon. Then eachmolecule continuesmoving in the direction and at the speed itwas
already traveling, but with nothing to constrain it. Soon the molecules arrange
themselves in a series of concentric sphereswith the fastestmolecules travelingmost
quickly towards the spherical wall of the room and slower ones lined up behind
according to speed. In each concentric, speed-ranked sphere, eachmolecule lines up
next to others traveling in nearly the same direction. Increasing the allowable
disorder (letting the molecules spread out) has created very discernable order.
Now change this scenario: The spherical wall of the room starts out close to the
balloon, but can expand smoothly away from it. Now the amount of order created
will depend on the speed of the wall’s expansion. If it expands faster than the gas
molecules—keeping out of their way—the gas expansion will create order just as if
the wall were not there. If the wall expands more slowly, the growing amount of
actual disorder causedwhenmolecules bump into it may keep upwith the growing
potential for disorder. If that happens, the system will generate no new order.
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The universal expansion, in tandem with the laws of physics, is responsible for
the order we find in the actual World. This order is of two broad types: chemical
and structural.74 We find the structural order in clumpiness, in the fact that matter
is densely packed at certain points (e.g. inside stars) and nearly absent at others
(e.g. interstellar space).75 According to the standard cosmogonical model, this
clumpiness originated through the interplay of quantum uncertainty, the tug of
gravity, and the expansion of spacetime.76 Like all forms of order, the Universe’s
clumpiness embodies information. Even when all stars burn out and all black
holes dissolve, there will still be order (information) in the Universe so long as
matter is not uniformly distributed. A state of maximum entropy (zero
information—the ‘‘heat death’’) would therefore require eliminating this clumpi-
ness. However, if spacetime expands more rapidly than thermodynamic processes
can create disorder, matter will never be uniformly distributed. Therefore,
depending on its expansion rate, the Universe could go on storing and processing
information forever. Because this logically possible outcome would enhance
richness, Leibniz’ cosmology predicts it will occur: The Universe will expand so
rapidly that order is never lost, but not so rapidly as to destroy itself.77
Another point distinguishes Leibnitian cosmology from other theories. If
Leibniz is right, then at its beginning the Universe must have been maximally
simple. It must have contained as little structure as possible, since structure adds
to complexity. On the other hand, to be maximally rich, the Universe in its totality
must be replete with diverse, complex, non-repetitive structure. How can a
Universe be maximally simple, yet also maximally complex? The only way is for it
to change and the general direction of change must be away from simplicity
toward complex structure. Since Leibniz’ theory requires change, it also requires
time. Time is change. We measure space with a ruler; we measure time with
a clock. The difference is this: clocks change; rulers do not. Today, time is only
an unexplained aspect of nature. Leibniz’ theory explains why we experience
time.
His theory is also uniquely consistent with the large-scale geometry of our
Universe. Our actual Universe began at a moment of maximal simplicity and from
that point has expanded continuously, creating structure by expanding. Our past,
our future, and the arrow of time that links them all emerge from this universal
expansion.78 The predicted need of the best possible Universe to originate in
maximal simplicity and yet to contain maximal richness explains why we
experience these phenomena. Leibniz could not have guessed at the big bang and
the subsequent universal expansion, yet his theory implicitly predicts them. His
claim that the Universe is at the conjoint maximum of simplicity and richness, is
the most parsimonious explanation for the negligible complexity of its actual laws
and conditions and the vast richness of its actual phenomena.
Conclusion
Leibniz’ metaphysical conjecture, derived from his notion of God’s perfection,
generates a coherent, testable description of the best possible Universe. That
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description closely resembles the actual Universe. Further analysis and empirical
investigation should explore the possibility that Leibniz’ claim might be correct.79
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